According
to Nardin, a general definition of tradition is, “a long-established practice
possessing something like the force of law, a practice that is authoritative
precisely because of its status as a tradition” (6). However, the definition of tradition is much
deeper, since all long-held practices are not necessarily considered a
tradition. Martin Krygier believed that
there were three characteristics that defined a practice as a tradition. First, the tradition is at least believed to
be rooted in the past—whether it actually is or not. For example, a people might come to believe
that a sacred ritual was practiced by their ancestors. If historical evidence proves this to be
false, it does not negate the fact that the people practicing the ritual believe
it to be the same as the ritual their ancestors performed. Krygier’s second criteria is that the
practice is given some type of authority, and the third criteria is that the
practice has been “passed down over intervening generations” (7). However, Nardin rejects Krygier’s rigid
characteristics, acknowledging that, “while some traditions rest on dogma or
the authority of a body of shared beliefs, others rest on the authority of a
common framework of laws and procedures” (8).
Nardin views
ethical traditions as practices that can and must change over time. They
are subject to debate and interpretation by their very nature and can never be
distilled down to a “way that is authoritative in all contexts” (5). Ethical traditions are practices that are ideological
and historic in nature. For instance, to
understand ethical traditions, one must examine the tradition at different
contextual points in history as well as observing how it has changed over
time. By this type of examination, one
can perceive what is considered right and wrong with regards to both domestic
and international relations.
The social
contract tradition has evolved over time from its initial definition by Thomas
Hobbes and serves to explain how “legitimate political institutions might arise”
(181). The basic premise is that
individuals agree via a contract to give up rights and cede control to a
central governing authority, which “set up a framework for deliberation and
choice” (182). Mapel explains that the
situation that exists prior to creating the social contract—or the initial
choice situation—is “the most important part of any contractarian argument and
the principal source of diversity within the tradition” (182). While the exact manner in which the social
contract is created has changed throughout history, the basic tenants of social
contract tradition remain central in many aspects of modern society.
Hobbes initial theory was based on
both his pessimistic view of human nature as well as his belief that humans are
ruled by a purely mechanistic model of interactions—similar to how inanimate
objects obey the laws of physics. Hobbes
created what he called the State of Nature to describe a theoretical existence
absent any form of government, where man would be at perpetual war with each
other due to man’s inherent self-interest.
In order for man to escape this brutal existence, where notions of
justice simply do not exist, he agrees to give up certain rights and enter into
a social contract whereby he cedes control to a central authority—what Hobbes
called the Leviathan. A primary concern
in this type of social contract is that every man is equal and gives up rights
equally. For instance, if one man agrees
that he cannot kill his neighbor, his neighbor must also agree not to kill him
in turn. Only by entering into this
social contract can man feel secure within the state. In Hobbes’ vision of the social contract
theory, once the contract is in place, the sovereign has full authority that
the people have no right to challenge.
For Hobbes, security within the
state was of central importance.
International relations between states only mattered insofar as the
state should be able to protect itself from others. Hobbes’ more pessimistic view of the
international system is understandable, as he was writing during a turbulent
time in both English and world history. Hobbes
desire for a legitimate and protective central authority amidst the chaos of
the English Civil War in 1642 prompted him to write Leviathan. In this case, no
matter how repressive the government might be, Hobbes asserted that it was
preferable to the “brutish” absence of state.
Locke’s more optimistic notion of
the State of Nature (or life without a state) evolves his overall conception of
the social contract from that of Hobbes.
In Locke’s State of Nature, men generally remain peaceful within a
natural moral context. Locke asserted
that the primary conflict within this state was the need to protect one’s
private property and this was the driving force between man creating the social
contract and submitting to a government.
Locke’s vision of government, however, was quite different from
Hobbes. Not only was the government
obliged to protect its citizens’ rights, but it was also the duty of the
citizens to overthrow a corrupt government.
Locke’s notions of the social contract and resulting government
influenced the Founding Fathers of the United States, and many aspects of his
theories still remain central tenants of our Constitution.
Both Hobbes and Locke, as well
other classical social contract theorists, such as Kant and Rousseau, felt that
the social contract tradition had little use in regards to international
relationships between states. As Mapel
explains, “the state is much more capable of surviving in the international
arena than are individuals before the domestic social contract” (188). In other words, once individuals are
protected by social contract on a state level, there is no need to do so on the
international level. In these
circumstances, preservation of the state is of primary importance, falling
under a realist view that states must gain power over neighboring states. Rousseau argued that large governing bodies
could not form social contracts and a world of small democratic republics
actually removed the need for an international authoritative organization.
The modern social contract
theorists have rejected this notion as they have addressed the possibility of
“employing a social contract to create a world federation or government”
(191). Of primary importance to this
notion is that reciprocity does exist on an international level. One reason for this, they argue, is the
emergence of non-state actors within the international system. With organizations such as the United
Nations, there is some degree of authority at the international level as states
agree to abide by international rules, although adherence to these rules is
questionable.
The main evolution of the social
contract theory by the modern contractarians is the attempt to extend the
notion of individual rights in the state to individual rights within the
international system. For social
contract theory to work within the international system, Mapel explains that,
“each person in international society is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar
system of liberty for all” (193). In our
current political climate, this does not seem like a realistic goal. As Krauthammer explained, “unlike the domestic
social contract, international law lacks an enforcer … If one country breaks the rules at will …
[what] can possibly oblige other countries to honor that claim?” (196).
In conclusion, the social contract
theory on a national level has endured quite well. Most aspects of national law can be
attributed to the social contract theory, as citizens implicitly agree to be
bound by state and federal laws. In
addition, social contracts also govern many aspects of our personal lives as
binding agreements between individuals.
However, on the international level, social contract theory currently
falls short, as there is no true way to enforce a social contract between
states at this time. While the United
Nations is a noble endeavor, lack of oversight and corruption has led to loss
of integrity within the institution, diminishing both its legitimacy and
authority.
Work Cited
Nardin, Terry, and David Mapel. Traditions of International Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992. Print.
No comments:
Post a Comment