A Review of The Roman Republic and The Causes of Its End

            The Republic of Rome stood for almost five hundred years from its beginning in 509 BCE to 27 BCE when it officially became an empire.  The subject of the Republic’s end warrants reflection in several areas of Roman life and culture.  However, to fully understand the Republic’s downfall, its rise and expansion must first be examined in order to understand how it came to pass that the Ides of March was even possible on March 15, 44 BCE.

The early system of government the Romans used was that of a Senate that was in place during the reign of the Etruscan Kings. Once the Etruscan Kings were forced out in 509 BCE, the patrician class were the purveyors of law for society with laws being based upon religion and sacred tradition.  The positions of two consuls were created and elected by the Senate in order to handle the military, serve as judges, and enact legislation (Perry et al 117). The consuls also had the ability to elect a dictator to serve for six months in a time of crisis. One of the most notable was a farmer named Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus that served a brief period as dictator in 458 BCE and returned to his farm after saving a Roman consular army that was surrounded ("Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus | Biography - Roman Statesman").

Shortly after the Republic of Rome was founded in 509 BCE, starting in 494 BCE, a nearly two hundred year war between the patrician class and the plebeian class ensued.  This was called the Conflict of the Orders or Struggle of the Orders.  The Roman elite were obstinate, yet ultimately had to craft a constitution based on civic needs and not that of religious perceptions.  It was a long and painful process that occurred in stages, beginning with the plebeian grievances of enslavement for debt, a lack of representation in legislation and law, as well as a general resentment of the reduced station that the patricians forced upon them.  The constitution grew and accommodated the needs of Roman life, with jurists using a common sense approach to law that replaced religious interpretation.  The Romans became less involved with religious practice over time and more involved with civic and social concerns, leading them to a more stoic perspective in law and culture (Perry et al 118-120).

The Conflict of the Orders never allowed the Romans to lose their sense of patriotism or civic duty.  They allowed for the defense against outside encroachment of nearby Italic tribes and even expanded Rome’s territory.  The conflict never progressed into a deathly struggle between the plebian and patrician classes and gives testament to Roman malleability when faced with crisis concerning the state.  The expansion during the two hundred years of this conflict could never have been accomplished without civic cohesion and stability within the state.

            Through the years of the class conflict, reforms were passed in order to appease the plebeian class.  There were up to five secessio plebis or secession of the plebeian class during the nearly two hundred years, with the first secession creating representation with tribunes and magistrates for the commoners.  The secession were in effect a strike of the working class and soldier that forced the aristocracy to make concessions for representation.  Ultimately, this culminated in the adoption of Lex Hortensia, where the plebeian class would now entertain full rights and be able to make laws binding all citizens and disallowing patricians any exception to the law.

            With the gains in representation and the same rights of the patrician class, plebeian income and employment began to spiral downward due to the long campaigns of defense and conquest that were needed in order to secure the Republic on the Italian peninsula.  The Romans were brutal in their conquest securing the peninsula, but they also used generosity and reward in order to endear conquered tribes and people into fealty to the Republic.  The Romans were remarkable at assimilating other cultures into Roman life, and the results enabled them to emerge as a premier Mediterranean power.  In the early stages of the Republic, conflicts with nearby Latin kinsmen, Italian tribes, the Etruscans, as well as the Pyrrhic wars with the southern Greek colonies solidified The Italian Confederation of states and put them on a collision course with Carthage (Perry et al 120).

            The rise to a Mediterranean power caused an eventual conflict with the Carthaginian Empire that began what is known as the Punic Wars. The first Punic War was the result of Roman concern for the interference of trade or a staging area for conquest with Messana, a Sicilian city.  There were many in Rome that felt expansion would be detrimental to the Republic, but concern for the security of vulnerable southern states would be the deciding factor in Rome mobilizing against Carthage. Rome lost heavily in the initial confrontations, but the war lasted three years and they never wavered from their resolve for victory.  They were able to replenish severe losses of land and naval forces in a short time with the allied neighbors it acquired from the consolidation of the Italian peninsula (Perry et al 122).

            The Second Punic War was nearly the end of Rome. Hannibal started his march through Spain seeking precious resources in order to supply his army for the march that he was about to begin on Rome and its surrounding lands.  He was able to march across the Alps with an army complete with elephants that consisted of Carthaginians, with a large contingent of Gaels, Libyans, Numidian’s, and Spaniards amounting to 26,000 soldiers that were able to survive the treacherous crossing of the Alps.  Hannibal’s forces suffered losses due to accidents and raids overcoming detachments, but the majority of attrition was caused by desertion (Perry et al 122).

            The most costly battle ever experienced in the Ancient world was handed to the Romans by Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae in 216 BCE. Rome had fielded 80,000 men that were encircled and slaughtered by Hannibal’s army leaving 50,000 dead Romans after a systematic butchering.  The Senate took immediate measures to compensate for building new armies in order to confront Hannibal (Perry et al 122-124).

            The Romans dodged direct confrontation with Hannibal’s army and Hannibal could never muster a knockout blow to Rome itself.  This allowed for adjustments to be made by the Senate, such as doubling taxes and allowing for slaves and young men of seventeen to join the army. Women and children were ordered indoors to reduce panic, and they limited mourning to thirty days.  Although they lost allies to Hannibal, they were still able to recruit well enough to keep the defense of Rome strong and send a Roman force to Africa, forcing Hannibal’s’ withdrawal.  Scipio Africanus met Hannibal at Zama and was finally able to defeat the expert military commander ending the Second Punic War in 202 BCE.  A disarmament of naval forces, giving up their elephants, and the loss of the rich resources of Spain were the immediate consequences the Romans placed upon the Carthaginians.  With Macedon fearing Roman expansion, Philip the V made an alliance with Hannibal when Rome was at its most vulnerable.  Fear of invasion caused Rome to engage Macedon starting in 205 BCE with the first Macedonian War. Two more wars with Macedon resulted in Rome finally creating the province of Macedonia in 148 BCE after the third and final confrontation (Perry et al 123-124).

            In 149 BCE, Rome perpetuated the third Punic War against Carthage and committed the annihilation of the Carthaginians.  Hatred from the fear of Hannibal’s near conquest of Rome seeded the deplorable actions used by the Romans and this also marked a time where the Senate had openly lost control of their reason and stoicism.  This solidified the imperialistic direction that the Roman Republic began to take as the political institutions became compromised with self-service beyond anything previously experienced.  The Republic became entrenched in a foreign policy of security through conquest that the political system was unable control.

            Locally, the plebeian class normally owned land outside the city where as the more wealthy patricians owned land within the safety of Rome. With war taking many commoners away from their farms, the wealthier landowners were able to maximize their own profits and also exploit the plebian farms by buying their lands for very little as the less wealthy farmers faced insurmountable debt. Consequently, with the influx of slaves into the Roman workforce from conquered territories, the poorer farmers were not able to keep up with the larger farms and this added to the unemployment and disrepair of the plebian farms.  This led to displaced farmers moving into city slums, where they struggled to survive and perpetuated a culture of dependency instead of self-reliance (Perry et al 131).

Tiberius Gracchus attempted to rectify this situation after he was elected tribune.  He tried to reinstate laws that had been ignored by the Senate that allowed Romans to only utilize 312 acres of publicly owned land.  If Romans were held to this limit, it would free up land that the displaced farmers could return to.  However, the Senate viewed Tiberius as a threat to their rule, as related by Plutarch:

“…the men of wealth and substance, however, were led by their greed to hate the law, and by their wrath and contentiousness to hate the law-giver, and tried to dissuade the people by alleging that Tiberius was introducing a re-distribution of land for the confusion of the body politic, and was stirring up a general revolution” (Perry 121).

The senate failed to turn the people against Tiberius, so they murdered him and three hundred of his followers.  Tiberius’ brother Gaius took up his brother’s mantle and also attempted to reenact the land laws and help the struggling poor.  Unfortunately, the Senate dealt with him in the same manner as his brother, by murdering him and over three thousand of his followers.  This established the Senate as a corrupt organization that would use brutal means to remain in control (Perry et al 131-132).

At this point, the Senate became an oligarchy that was solely self-interested and ignored affairs of the state.  The rich vied for positions within the Roman government, which led to in-fighting and upheaval.  At this time, unscrupulous tribunes ingratiated themselves with the masses by promising them more and more hand-outs, known as “bread and circuses”—cheap grain and free coliseum admissions.  All the reasons Aristotle had laid out to explain why democracy degenerates into a dangerous type of government came to pass with the rise of these demagogues who were able to control the “mob”—Rome’s poor masses.  These citizens were so downtrodden that they were willing to vote for those who promised the most.  Sallust described the state of these citizens when he said, “In every country paupers envy respectable citizens and make heroes of unprincipled characters, hating the established order of things and hankering after innovation; discontented with their own lot, they are bent on general upheaval” (Perry 125). 

Meanwhile, the military generals further contributed to the Republic’s downfall.  This began with Marius, who recruited the poor for his armies with promises of monetary rewards and tracts of lands upon completion of service.  Since these citizens were dissatisfied with Rome, their loyalties were solely with Marius, so long as he could pay them what he promised.  This created a model that subsequent generals would follow in order to consolidate personal power.  The generals’ armies became private armies rather than Roman armies, and civil war broke out with rival generals fighting each other for their own political motivations and control of Rome. This led to a brutal conflict between Marius and Sulla, culminating with Sulla briefly becoming Rome’s dictator where he assassinated his political rivals.  Sulla then reinstated the Senate and retired, but the Senate was never able to adequately wield its regained authority.  The success of Sulla, which granted riches to those in his army, inspired others to abandon their lives as laborers and seek the same profit (Perry et al 133-134).  Sallust described this when he said, “young men from the country, whose labour on the farms had barely kept them from starvation, had been attracted by the private and public doles available at Rome, and preferred an idle city life to such thankless toil” (Perry 125). 

The Cateline conspiracy and Cicero’s response to it further demonstrates the crumbling of the Republican government.  Cateline was a participant in Sulla’s reign of terror and later attempted to stage his own coup to overthrow the government.  As a demagogue, Cateline appealed to all aspects of Roman society, from the rich to the poor.  At the time, Cicero was a consul and was aware of Cateline’s actions.  Cicero condemned Cateline to the Senate, who were unconvinced of the threat.  After obtaining proof of the conspiracy, Cicero had several members of the conspiracy executed without trial, which alarmed the Senate ("Catiline | Biography - Roman Politician").  Sallust described the conspiracy as a “deadly, moral contagion” (Perry 125) and its participants as wanting to “…destroy both themselves and their country” (Perry 124).

In 60 BC, yet another plot to overthrow the government arose with the triumvirate of Julius Caesar, Pompey and Crassus.  Caesar was a politician who had the favor of the people for being an accomplished orator and successful military leader.  Caesar then launched a military campaign against Gaul, where he further distinguished himself as an expert general.  The Senate feared that Caesar would be able to use his popularity to gain control of the state.  With the death of Crassus in 53 BC, the triumvirate had dissolved, and a jealous Pompey distanced himself from Caesar and aligned himself closely with the Senate.  The Senate demanded that Caesar step down from command but Caesar refused and marched on Rome.  The Senate ceded control to Caesar and appointed him the office of dictator for a period of ten years (Perry et al 134-135). 

Caesar endeavored to help the Republic with his policies, by attempting to restore order and help the poor.  He became popular with the people and somewhat successful in his activities, which only made the Senate fearful for their futures.  When Caesar converted his 10 year term as dictator into a lifetime appointment, the Senate plotted to assassinate him—a plot that was successfully carried out on March 15 of 44 BC, which came to be known as the “Ides of March.”  Unfortunately, Caesar’s assassination did not restore the Roman Republic.  Instead, civil war ensued, with many vying for control of Rome.  This civil war destroyed the last vestiges of the former Roman Republic.  Octavian, Caesar’s adopted son, became the first official Roman emperor in 31 BC (Perry et al 136).
       The fall of the Roman Republic was multi-faceted and not caused by a single event.  Successful expansion brought riches into the Republic and an influx of slave labor that undermined the poor.  These changes happened too rapidly for the city-state government to handle, and social instability led to unrest.  The rich concerned themselves more with maintaining their lifestyles than attending to state affairs.  Demagogues undermined the political process by using the agitated lower classes against the senate, and Roman generals created private armies to use for their personal agendas.   These are some of the factors that left the Republic in such a poor state that Julius Caesar was able to seize control by promising to stabilize the government. Although Caesar's reign was short-lived, he had paved the way for his heir, Octavian, to fully end the Republic and transform Rome into an empire. 

Works Cited

Catiline | biography - Roman politician. (2008, November 12). Retrieved March 15, 2015, from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/99879/Catiline

Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus | biography - Roman statesman. (n.d.). Retrieved March 15, 2015, from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/117993/Lucius-Quinctius-Cincinnatus

Perry, Marvin, Myrna Chase, James R. Jacob, Margaret C. Jacob, Jonathan W. Daly, and Theodore H. Von Laue. Western Civilization: Ideas, Politics, and Society. 11th ed. Vol. 1. Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, 2013. Print.

Perry, Marvin. Sources of the Western Tradition. 9th ed. Vol. 1. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2014. Print.