The United Nations was founded in 1945 as a successor
to the failed League of Nations as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) with
the purpose to maintain international peace and establish cooperation between
nations. Since its inception, ethical
questions have arisen regarding its tenets as compared to its actions. The paper will focus on the United Nations
(UN) as a non-state actor and its role in global humanitarian intervention and
the use of pre-emptive military actions against a belligerent state. Additionally, it will examine the UN’s
legitimacy as a global sovereign authority.
It will analyze the UN’s actions in the context of just war theory and
demonstrate the inconsistencies in the UN’s actions as they apply to the main
tenants of the theory.
The preamble of the UN Charter states
that its primary purpose is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”[1]
To achieve these goals, the UN devised a set of rules that incorporate
just war principles within its charter.
The UN is a non-state actor, which would normally preclude its ability
to participate as a legitimate authority in global conflicts within just war
tradition. However, in Chapter V,
article 24, member nations agree to allow the Security Council to act in their
stead, lending the UN legitimacy.[2]
Many of the articles within the UN
Charter contain guidelines which are reflective of just war tradition. For instance, in Chapter VI, Article 33, the
Security Council (SC) must exhaust all peaceful solutions to a conflict prior
to authorizing an armed response. On the
other hand, Article 39 grants the SC the ability to “determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and decide
upon a recourse of action. Classical
just war theory would allow action based on an act of aggression, but “any
threat to peace” is vague and seems to be an abstract goal rather than a
concrete principle. Another important
tenet that confirms the UN’s commitment to satisfying just war theory is
Chapter VII, Article 51, which states that the UN cannot bar member nations
from collective self-defense if confronted by an act of aggression.[3]
This mirrors Walzer’s jus ad bellum
conditions which allow any nation under threat of aggression to act in
self-defense. With these examples, it is
clear that the United Nation’s charter does attempt to conform to just war
principles.
A main ethical concern with allowing
the UN to act on other countries’ behalf to initiate armed conflict is whether
the UN can be considered a legitimate sovereign authority within just war
tradition. Traditionally, the state has
been considered the sovereign authority, since each state is responsible for
its citizens. Can this authority be
transferred to an international entity?
Several scholars have examined this question. Michael Boulette examines the debate on this
subject between the Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams and Catholic
commentator George Weigel. Williams
noted that in contemporary society, the question of sovereign authority has
largely been ignored, so he sought to reconcile the UN’s role with Thomas
Aquinas original interpretation of sovereign authority.[4]
Boulette explains that Aquinas viewed
the right to wage war as a fundamental principle when determining if a war is
just. Aquinas argued that private
individuals could not use force for the common good, whereas a sovereign
authority could.[5]
Aquinas further explained that rather than wage war himself, an
individual should seek redress from a superior authority. However, the sovereign is responsible for its
citizens and is therefore required to act if their common good is
threatened. Archbishop Williams argued
that the UN should be considered the only legitimate authority by analogizing
individual member states to private individuals. With this analogy, the member states have
agreed to cede control to the UN, who is responsible for protecting their
common good. Boulette expands this
argument by stating that
“just
as the private individual may not properly resort to force because she may seek
redress from a superior authority charged with the protection of a common good,
a member state may appeal to the Security Council and the International Court
of Justice for the peaceful resolution of disputes…” [6]
With
Williams’ analogy and Boulette’s further interpretation, member states
themselves have no legitimate authority to wage war without the express
permission of the UN SC. However, both
agree that just as Aquinas’ guidelines do not prevent a private individual from
self-defense if attacked, the UN charter allows member nations to protect
themselves if they are subject to an act of aggression.
Catholic commentator George Weigel
rejects the analogy that equates member states to private individuals. Primarily, Weigel maintains that member
states remain responsible for the common good of their citizens, unlike a
private individual. Weigel argues that
“individual nations cannot legitimately discharge their right to wage just wars
without betraying their fundamental obligation to protect their citizens and
the common good.”[7] Weigel further contends that the UN is
ineffectual and unresponsive to the needs of the international community, and
therefore, it does not protect the common good.
On that additional basis, the UN cannot be considered a sovereign
authority. Weigel also asserts that the
common good cannot be served while member states are beholden to the permanent
members of the Security Council.
Davis Brown of the University of
Virginia also tackles the question of proper authority in just war theory and
how it applies to the UN SC. Brown
argues that it is the sole responsibility of the state itself to remedy an
injury and that it is wrong to transfer this right to any other power.[8]
Brown’s reasoning on this point centers around the fact that while there
are multilateral political forums, there is no single “super sovereign” who can
enforce their judgments upon the states.
He reasons that if the UN SC finds a war just, they are most likely
correct, simply because the five permanent members of the council have such
diverse ideologies that if they agree on anything, it is probably an
overwhelming consensus. However, because
of this diversity within the SC, any war that is not found just is suspect because
of the veto power of the permanent members.
He contends that many resolutions are not even heard because of the mere
threat of a veto.
Brown further declares that a
majority decision does not guarantee that the decision is moral due to regional
and national political agendas to which the UN is susceptible, such as member
nations voting out of self-interest rather than based on the merits of the
resolution.[9]
Brown cites the Zionism resolution of 1975 as a prime example of this
mentality, where many nations supported the overtly anti-Semitic declaration to
improve their relationship with Arab states and the Soviet Union. Additionally, Brown argues that the SC supports
‘popular’ states while treating ‘unpopular’ states harshly. Again, he cites Israel as an example, where
they were condemned for their anticipatory attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor
in 1981. While many of these scholars do
argue that the UN should be considered a legitimate authority within the realm
of just war tradition, they all agree that some work needs to be done to remove
bias and be more consistent in their actions.
Another moral concern, relatively new
in the realm of just war theory, is the UN’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
doctrine and its use of humanitarian intervention. R2P is founded on the notion that the
sovereign state has a responsibility to protect its citizens and when they
fail, other sovereign states have a responsibility to step in. Bellamy and Williams explained that R2P was
formally and unanimously adopted by the UN member states at the 2005 World
Summit, though the UN SC has been involved with intervention issues since the
1990s.[10]
The mandate calls for intervention when states fail to conform to global
humanitarian laws and engage in human rights violations, such as genocide and
other crimes against humanity. The
emphasis is on civilian protection, and UN troops are to “use all means
necessary” to achieve this goal. Evans and
Sahnoun defined humanitarian intervention as “coercive action against a state
to protect people within its borders from suffering grave harm.”[11]
Like Bellamy and Williams, they clarify that intervention should be used
as a last resort and it is only warranted in two extreme cases. The first is the real risk of genocidal loss
of life, and the second is large-scale ethnic cleansing, which could involve
murder, rape or expulsion.
Ned Dobos explored R2P to determine if
it could satisfy just war principles. In
addition, he asked if the UN SC should be the only legitimate authority who can
determine if human intervention is morally necessary.[12]
The first debate is whether the UN has any right to interfere in a
matter that is contained entirely within a sovereign state’s borders, since the
Charter explicitly states, in Chapter I, Article 2, that the UN is not
authorized to “intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters
to settlement under the present Charter.”[13]
However, Dobos explains that those who debate this issue claim that
human rights violations are not solely “within the domestic jurisdiction” of a
state and are a matter that concerns the international community. There is a further divide between those who
agree that the UN has a right to intervene in the name of preserving “the
peace.” Some argue that the UN SC should
be the sole authority when authorizing humanitarian intervention, while others
believe that they should not have that exclusive right—an individual state can
also lawfully intervene without the UN SC’s approval. Rather than solely focusing on whether UN
intervention is moral, Dobos takes the argument one step further and asks if
the UN’s failure to intervene could be considered immoral.
Overall, Dobos argues that a sanction
by the UN SC contributes substantially to the internal legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention by a state.[14]
Principally, this is due to the internal cost, in money and resources,
that a single state would need to bear.
Singly, the cost might be too much of a burden upon that state’s
citizens. However, with a UN mandate,
the burden can be shared across multiple states, easing the burden on any one
state. Likewise, Dobos argues that UN
authorization only legitimizes humanitarian intervention indirectly by helping
a state meet the conditions that allow the action to be just, such as
proportionality and the likelihood of success.
However, if a state can meet these conditions, does the state require
the UN’s approval for it to be morally necessary? Those who say yes claim that the UN SC
approval is needed to keep states from engaging in humanitarian intervention
for ulterior motives. Dobos rejects this
argument, stating that even if a state has an ulterior motive to intervene, it
does not diminish the good that is done.
While Dobos does contend that states
should generally attempt to gain UN approval for humanitarian intervention, he
declines the idea that it is a requirement.[15]
He has two key issues with the current operating procedure of the
UN. First, the UN has been largely
ineffective in its peacekeeping missions, and he cites Rwanda in 1994 as an
example. Authorization was given, but
not enough member states were willing to provide troops to be effective. He also condemns the veto system, since it
“prevents the Security Council from reaching decisions in a truly democratic
manner.” Several scholars agree with
this assessment, such as Charles Krauthammer, who asked why the ‘butchers of
Tiananmen Square’ had a say in whether America could intervene in Iraq. Dobos states that if the UN were to become
more democratic and abolish the veto system, it would be an improvement but
would still not give the UN sole authority, “since the imperative to prevent
grave human rights violations will always take moral priority over fidelity to
international contracts.”[16]
In a similar vein as Dobos, John
Davenport examines the UN SC as the sole legitimate authority when it comes to
endorsing humanitarian intervention.[17]
Davenport first scrutinizes humanitarian intervention in the context of
just war theory. Davenport concludes
that just war theory does condone such action by making the argument that there
are important public goods that need law at the global level to achieve, which
includes a minimal list of basic human rights.
Because of this, a global sovereign authority is required to coordinate
and enforce these goods (human rights), which he calls the Coordination
Principle. For this coordination to
work, the sovereign authority must be democratic and answer to the combined
citizens of the member states. He argues
that beyond human rights, this primary sovereign authority would also be
responsible for global concerns such as the environment and global
marketplace. Davenport maintains that
this argument is in line with just wary theory.
He creates the example of Hitler, and postulates that it is absurd to
consider the idea that if Hitler had not invaded any other countries that the
Holocaust would not be considered a ‘crime against humanity.” He suggests that in this case, intervention
would not only be morally good but obligatory as well.
However, Davenport argues that the UN
does not act as his theoretical sovereign authority should.[18]
His main contention is that the UN was formed after World War II and
many compromises were made to secure the peace.
Because of this, dictatorships were allowed on the SC, and its structure
and processes are not democratic in nature.
Furthermore, the UN does not have the proper means to coordinate
intervention efforts, making them ineffective.
Davenport maintains that UN reform to achieve these goals is not
possible because the necessary changes would never be approved by all five
permanent members of the SC or a two-thirds majority of member states.
To understand the UN’s effectiveness
with its R2P and humanitarian intervention policies, it is prudent to examine
several specific cases. Rwanda in 1993
is the case that most scholars cite to point to the UN’s failings in this
arena. The UN had the approval of the
interim government to offer humanitarian aid and oversee the cease-fire between
the Hutu government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front.[19]
Unfortunately, the UN ignored a cable warning of the risk of genocide
and was incapable of helping when the Rwandan government slaughtered an
estimated 800,000 Tutsis and Hutus. Once
the slaughter began, the UN SC failed to reinforce the NATO-led troops. Even worse was the withdrawal of UN troops
after civilians had gathered at a school seeking their protection.
The first time the UN SC authorized
force for humanitarian intervention against the wishes of the state and its
central government was in Libya in 2011.
James Pattison investigates the UN actions in Libya to first determine
if intervention was warranted and then to analyze the UN’s implementation and
where it went wrong. Pattison states
that while Walzer did not believe the intervention was warranted, he
disagrees. Pattison argues that Libya
met the parameters of a real risk of large-scale loss of life or the real risk
of large-scale ethnic cleansing since Qaddafi indicated in his “no mercy”
speech that he intended to “cleanse” the city of Benghazi. By the time that the UN authorized
intervention, there was evidence that the government had already had several
thousand of its own citizens murdered.
So, while Pattison argues that intervention was warranted, he denies
that forcible regime change was required.
Pattison maintains that the
requirements to pursue forcible regime change should be much higher than
intervention because the consequences of such an action pose far greater risks,
such as more innocents being killed and greater instability in the neighboring
regions.[20]
For the most part, in these circumstances, these harms would outweigh
the good. According to Pattison, at
first, in the initial stages, the intervention in Libya seemed to have the goal
of civilian protection, so the initially it was warranted and morally
permissible. However, “mission creep”
eventually compromised the UN’s actions, as the objective shifted toward regime
change versus civilian protection.
Pattison feared that it would lead to greater civilian and military
deaths, along with the possibility of a worse regime taking over. Pattison argues that the possibility of a
permissible intervention that later becomes morally unsound needs to be
assessed according to just war theory.
He maintains that it is not enough to apply jus ad bellum rules solely at the commencement of the action. Rather, jus
ad bellum needs to be reassessed throughout the in bello period as new phases of operations are enacted. He further elucidates that jus ad bellum should be applied prior to
any use of force, such as the bombing of a specific target.
Pattison also contends that long-term
consequences need to be analyzed when deciding whether to begin a peace-keeping
operation.[21]
In this way, Pattison is adding jus
post bellum principles to R2P actions, which are currently
non-existent. He adds that key factors
need to be assessed beforehand, such as analyzing the amount of resources
available and how much local and global support they have. In this regard, Pattison believes that the
intervention in Libya was warranted as, according to these requirements, it was
expected to be successful in the long-term.
Pattison rejects the arguments which
state that intervention in Libya was not warranted because the UN had failed to
intervene in other similar crises in the past—such as Bahrain, Syria, or Yemen.[22]
While Pattison agrees that selectivity is a problem, he states that the
problem is not that the UN intervened in Libya but rather that they failed to
intervene in the other cases. He agrees
that the UN needs to be more consistent in its actions. However, he argues that no action in Libya or
anywhere else would be worse because “saving some lives is better than saving
none.”[23]
Like Pattison’s analysis of the
intervention in Libya, Bellamy and Williams delve into the UN intervention in
Cote d’Ivoire and examine its moral permissibility. The scope of the UN’s actions was brought
into question, such as the use of UN helicopters against heavy weapons, which
Russia argued did not fall under civilian protection.[24]
In Cote d’Ivoire, the impetus for peace-keeper presence was to oversee
the Linas-Marcoussis Accords and protect civilians using “all necessary means.” However, not enough resources were deployed
to be able to properly fulfill this role.
When the results of the presidential election were contested, resulting
in a resumption of armed conflict, the UN troops (UNOCI) with the aid of France
were unprepared to respond. Not only
were the troops unable to protect civilians after Gbagbo’s forces attacked, but
there were allegations that the troops themselves were committing atrocities
against the local population. When
Gbagbo refused to step aside, the UN condemned his actions and reauthorized UNOCI
to use all necessary means to protect civilians. However, there was disagreement among SC
members as to what this entailed. China
insisted that UN troops should remain neutral, and India maintained that UN
troops should not actively participate in a forcible regime change and remain
impartial in the conflict. Overall, the
UN was criticized in this conflict for overstepping their boundaries and overriding
the Constitutional Council by supporting Ouattara as the winner of the
elections. Furthermore, the UN was
unduly influenced by France, causing it to lose its impartiality and ultimately
failed in its alleged goal of protecting civilians.
Beyond humanitarian intervention is
the question of whether pre-emptive military strikes can ever be morally
permissible within just war theory or the UN Charter. Lauri Calhoun argues that pre-emptive strikes
completely fail jus ad bellum
principles and its requirement of ‘last resort.’[25]
This is counter to the tenets set forth in the UN Charter. Furthermore, she contradicts proponents who
claim that pre-emptive strikes might be necessary to maintain peace by arguing
that they cause the world to be less safe and legitimize terrorism. She examines the aftermath of 9/11, which led
to pre-emptive strikes gaining more support internationally and its context
within the United States (US) strike against Iraq. Prior to 9/11, pre-emptive strikes would have
been considered an act of aggression.
Indeed, the unprovoked invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was used to justify
the 1991 Gulf War. However, the notion
of pre-emptive strikes is built on the approach of “stopping potential threats
before they reach the nation’s borders.”[26]
Calhoun vehemently argues that the US
reasoning to enter the war was specious at best.[27]
She cites evidence that the documents that were provided to prove the
presences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were forgeries, and Chief
Weapons Inspector Hans Blix was not convinced of the presence of any WMDs. Furthermore, Bush stated that removing Saddam
Hussein would bring peace to the area and resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Additional arguments were made
that Iraq needed to become democratic to protect the US from al-Qaeda
terrorists that were being harbored by Hussein.
Calhoun strenuously rejects those who
justify the war in hindsight, claiming that the world became a safer place
after Hussein’s removal. She states that
evidence points to this being patently untrue.
Moreover, the war destabilized the region and insurgent troops have
attacked and killed thousands of civilians.
Additionally, the US withdrew from the International Criminal Court
(ICC), preventing any indictment for its actions. She likens the US actions to those of a
vigilante seeking retribution as a private individual. She states that the US retaliation in Iraq is
akin to the unjust attack by terrorists on 9/11. By acting in this manner, the US essentially
legitimizes the way in which terrorists operate. Furthermore, Calhoun asserts that the
strategic rationale of a ‘war against terror’ is counter-productive. There is no ‘finite’ number of terrorists in
the world which can be eradicated. She
states that by sending soldiers to “kill everyone who appears to the US
administration to be dangerous will actually increase the net number of
terrorists in existence” because it breeds hatred and resentment, allowing
terrorists to ‘incubate.’[28]
In direct opposition to Calhoun, John
W. Lango argues that pre-emptive military strikes are completely in line with
the UN Charter and just war tradition.[29]
Accepting (and agreeing) with the UN’s movement toward a philosophy of
prevention versus reaction, Lango asks, “Should a UN culture of prevention
include an option of preventive military actions?” To answer this question within the realm of
just war tradition, Lango considers four aspects of such an action: legitimate
authority, just cause, last resort, and proportionality principles. The UN Charter, in Chapter VII, Article 49,
mandates the UN SC must determine if there is a breach of the peace, act of
aggression, or “threat to the peace.”
Lango contends that the presence of WMDs or the attempt to possess them
does represent a sufficient threat to peace.
Lango’s first argument centers around
UN duties to protect civilians against genocide.[30]
The presence of WMDs, in the form of nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons, poses a real genocidal threat.
Consequently, Chapter VII, Article 39 of the Charter allows the SC to
decide what measures it can take to restore and maintain peace. Therefore, the SC should have the option of
pre-emptive military action to prevent a breach of the peace. Lango does argue that while the UN possesses
this right, the UN Charter does not allow any single state to carry out
preventive military strikes on its own, as the US did against Iraq. According to the Charter, member states only
have the right to collective self-defense when confronted with an act of
aggression, and unilateral pre-emptive strikes do not fall into this
category. This is in accordance with the
legitimate authority principle, where a war can only be declared with proper
legal authorization. Since member states
sign the UN Charter, they must abide by its dictates (which did not happen with
the US-Iraq conflict). Lango does agree
that the ‘culture’ within the UN SC needs to be reformed to make it more
effective. Again, this is primarily due
to the veto power of any permanent member of the SC.
To determine if the presence of WMDs
satisfies the just cause principle, Lango examines three criteria that Walzer
used to determine if a first strike was morally legitimate: intent; degree; and urgency.[31]
Lango argues that the definition of intent needs to go further than
Walzer’s, which only considered intentional threats of injury. Lango asserts that a threat of injury from a
result of recklessness or negligence should also be considered, just as it is
within the Model Penal Code of the
American Law Institute. Lango further
reasons that the use of a WMD constitutes a real threat against a state’s
territorial integrity, such as with radioactive nuclear fallout or the spread
of a plague due to the intentional or unintentional release of a biological
weapon. Lango emphasizes that the
presence of WMDs always constitutes such a threat, though he concedes that the
magnitude of such a threat must be assessed to authorize pre-emptive strikes.
Next, Lango analyzes the last resort
principle, which decrees that non-military actions must be attempted prior to
an armed response.[32]
However, he contends that it does not mean that “all possible” measures
have been exhausted first. Primarily, if
delaying a pre-emptive strike substantially increases the magnitude of the
threat, then it is prudent to cease attempting non-military resolutions. He argues for a ‘minimization standard’ where
the maximum non-military measures are attempted concurrently with a minimal
amount of military actions, which would lessen the chance for an increase in
magnitude. He hypothesizes a situation
where North Korea sells a nuclear weapon to Syria, which is being transported
via ship. If Syria gains possession of
the weapon, it constitutes an extreme threat.
However, since there is some time before Syria gains control of the
weapon, they could be persuaded by diplomatic means to relinquish the
weapon. If that fails, the minimal
military action could be to board the ship and seize the weapon.
Finally, Lango determines if
pre-emptive military strikes can satisfy the proportionality principle.[33]
This principle, Lango explains, “requires that the probable good
consequences achieved by war should outweigh the probable harmful consequences
caused by it.”[34]
Lango maintains that his minimization rule helps satisfy the
proportionality condition. Since it is
not bound solely by military actions, “the line of least harm is sometimes best
exploited by using as many non-military actions as possible along with as
little military force as possible.”[35]
Therefore, the UN should use the minimization rule to ensure
proportionality and satisfy just war principles.
Peter Orebech also examines if
“anticipatory self-defense” is valid within just war tradition by analyzing the
US preventive war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.[36]
Orebech asks whether a terrorist attack by a non-state actor can trigger
and justify military actions as matter of self-defense. If the answer is yes, then the US had a right
to attack based on Article 51 of the UN Charter which requires that a state
notify the UN of such an action but does not require SC approval. Orebech, however, counters that the language
of self-defense implies it occurs in response to imminent threats that would
“cause massive death and devastation…the necessity of that self-defense is
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”[37]
In the case of the US, there was no attempt to negotiate and no imminent
threat of further devastation within the US.
Moreover, there was no actual or factual Afghan attack. Therefore, the US actions cannot be
considered as self-defense under the purview of Article 51 of the UN Charter or
within just war theory.
Orebech also discusses the problems
surrounding the permanent members of the SC, since it means that those nations
have very little to fear from the SC.[38]
He cites the 1956 Hungarian uprising against Soviet rule, where the SC
could not act due to lack of unanimity among the permanent members. Additionally, the SC rarely criticizes
belligerent acts by any of these states.
However, he declares that most states wish to avoid the stigmatism
associated with defying the UN SC and therefore attempt to use language that
lets them “get away with” belligerent actions, such as the case with the US
against Afghanistan.
While there are varying viewpoints by
scholars on whether the UN’s actions theoretically align with just war theory,
most agree that the UN in its current state is not entirely effective or
consistent in its operations. What needs
to change within the UN moving forward so it more closely aligns to just war
tradition? Most scholars agree that the
veto power of the permanent members of the SC is an immense problem and leads
to the UN’s ineffectiveness. This power
creates an uneven playing field because it only takes one member of the “Big 5”
to veto an action, even if that action would normally be considered morally
permissible by just war standards. In
addition, these members can also act with impunity because the UN is incapable
of acting against them, as has been the case with the US war against Iraq and
Russia’s attack on the Ukraine or with human rights violations in China.
Davenport proposes that a new
democratic federation should replace the UN because it would be far more
effective.[39]
The requirement of near unanimity needs to be abolished in favor of
majority rule to ensure that the greatest betterment of humanity is
achieved. Furthermore, Davenport states
it would “prevent holdouts from putting their local interests ahead of the
common good.” Additionally, all nations
need to participate “fairly,” rather than expecting a single country, such as
the United States, to bear the majority burden of providing resources. Moreover, this Democratic Federation (DC)
would have an executive and legislative branch that is led by elected citizens
from the combined people of all member nations.
The DC members would also be drawn from legitimate democratic states
only, though ‘associate memberships’ could be offered to “benign oligarchies or
theocracies respecting rights more basic than the right to rational popular
sovereignty.”[40]
Davenport asserts that once the might of such a global authority is
seen, tyrannical nations will fear it, and he goes a bit far to say it should
overthrow dictatorships and supplant them with democratic regimes.
On the other hand, Michael Lipson
maintains that the apparent hypocrisy within the UN is somewhat necessary for
it to be effective at all and labels this “organized hypocrisy.”[41]
The crux of his argument is that any international authority, including
the UN, must respond to the conflicting and competing needs of various
states. Furthermore, it is incumbent
upon the UN to somehow reflect its “external constituencies’ inconsistent
values and preferences.”[42]
Any replacement of the UN would be subject to these same pressures. Because of this, organizations, such as the
UN, must decouple their actions from their internal organizational
activity—when this creates inconsistent behavior, it constitutes organized
hypocrisy. Lipson’s main argument is
that if the UN (or any international organization) attempted to resolve all
global conflicts in an unbiased manner, it would lead to complete paralysis,
since this is not possible with the varied ideologies of its member
states. Therefore, the hypocrisy within
the UN is unavoidable. However, Lipson
fails to address the problem of the veto power of the permanent members of the
SC, which seems to be a more prevalent issue relating to the UN’s inconsistency
and hypocrisy.
In conclusion, the UN precepts, as
outlined in the UN Charter, do generally conform to just war principles. R2P and humanitarian intervention also
conform to just war principles when done correctly. However, the tendency of the UN to go beyond
the dictates of civilian protection and take sides in internal conflicts causes
it to overstep its boundaries, which was seen in both Libya and Cote
d’Ivoire. Furthermore, most pre-emptive
military strikes are difficult to justify within just war tradition, despite
Lango’s arguments to the contrary.
However, the biggest issue within the current UN structure, with which
most scholars agree, is the veto power of the permanent members of the SC. While this power exists, the UN will never be
an effective or legitimate sovereign authority, since any otherwise morally
just action can be overruled for any reason whatsoever. Additionally, these positions ensure that
these members can commit atrocities or unjust wars that can never be answered,
further reducing the UN’s efficacy. To
truly be considered a legitimate authority within just war tradition, the UN
needs to be abolished in favor of a more democratic entity that utilizes
republican principles to ensure impartiality among all member nations and the
organization’s governing body.
Bibliography
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Boulette, Michael P.
"Questioning Authority: Just War Theory, Sovereign Authority, and the
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[2] United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations"
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[4] Michael P. Boulette, "Questioning Authority: Just War
Theory, Sovereign Authority, and the United Nations," Vera Lex 10, no. 1-2 (winter 2009): accessed October 15, 2017,
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[5] Michael P. Boulette, "Questioning Authority: Just War
Theory, Sovereign Authority, and the United Nations," 148.
[6] Michael P. Boulette, "Questioning Authority: Just War
Theory, Sovereign Authority, and the United Nations," 149.
[7] Michael P. Boulette, "Questioning Authority: Just War
Theory, Sovereign Authority, and the United Nations," 152.
[8] Davis Brown, "Judging The Judges: Evaluating Challenges
To Proper Authority In Just War Theory," Journal of Military Ethics 10, no. 3 (2011), accessed November
1, 2017, doi:10.1080/15027570.2011.608491.
[9] Davis Brown, "Judging The Judges: Evaluating Challenges
To Proper Authority In Just War Theory."
[10] Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "The New Politics
of Protection? Cote D'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to
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[11] Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, "The Responsibility to
Protect," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002): 99,
doi:10.2307/20033347.
[12] Ned Dobos, "Is U.N. Security Council Authorisation for
Armed Humanitarian Intervention Morally Necessary?" Philosophia 38, no. 3 (2010), accessed October 30, 2017,
doi:10.1007/s11406-009-9233-1.
[13] Ned Dobos, 500.
[14] Ned Dobos
[15] Ned Dobos
[16] Ned Dobos, 533.
[17] John J. Davenport, "Just War Theory, Humanitarian
Intervention, And The Need For A Democratic Federation," Journal of Religious Ethics 39, no. 3 (2011), accessed
November 1, 2017, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9795.2011.00491.x.
[18] John
J. Davenport, "Just War Theory, Humanitarian Intervention, And The Need
For A Democratic Federation."
[19] Nicole Winfield, "Global Policy Forum," UN Failed
Rwanda, December 16, 1999, accessed December 06, 2017,
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International Affairs 25,
no. 03 (2011), accessed November 2, 2017, doi:10.1017/s0892679411000256.
[21] James
Pattison, "The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya."
[22] James Pattison.
[23] James Pattison, 277.
[24] Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, 825.
[25] Laurie Calhoun, "Pre-emption and Paradox," Global Change, Peace & Security16, no. 3 (2004),
doi:10.1080/0951274042000263744.
[26] Laurie Calhoun, 198.
[27] Laurie Calhoun, 199-200.
[28] Laurie Calhoun, 207.
[29] John W. Lango, "Preventive Wars, Just War Principles,
and the United Nations," The
Journal of Ethics 9,
no. 1-2 (2005), accessed October 17, 2017, doi:10.1007/s10892-004-3328-5.
[30] John W. Lango, 255.
[31] John W. Lango, 257-260.
[32] John W. Lango, 260-263.
[33] John W. Lango, 263-265.
[34] John W. Lango, 262.
[35] John W. Lango, 262.
[36] Peter Orebech, "UN Charter Article 51 and the Right to
an Anticipatory Self-defense: Validity of the US Preventive War Doctrine
against Al Qaeda," Middle East
Critique 23, no. 1
(2014), accessed November 2, 2017, doi:10.1080/19436149.2014.896595.
[37] Peter Orebech, 62.
[38] Peter Orebech, 59.
[39] John J. Davenport.
[40] John J. Davenport, 531.
[41] Michael Lipson,
"Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?" European Journal of
International Relations 13, no. 1 (2007), accessed November 1, 2017,
doi:10.1177/1354066107074283
[42] Michael Lipson, 9
